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Abstract
Congress is now debating legislation that would give independent physicians the right to bargain collectively
with managed care organizations. Proponents argue that this legislation is needed to counterbalance the
market power of managed care organizations; opponents argue that physicians can already gain leverage and
negotiating strength by forming group practices or through joint ventures with hospitals. This debate has
brought attention to the competitive nature of the health care marketplace, and physician responses to
managed care. This Issue Brief examines how physicians are reorganizing their practices to meet the demands
of the competitive marketplace.
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Editor’s Note:  Congress is now debating legislation that would give independent
physicians the right to bargain collectively with managed care organizations.
Proponents argue that this legislation is needed to counterbalance the market
power of managed care organizations; opponents argue that physicians can
already gain leverage and negotiating strength by forming group practices or
through joint ventures with hospitals. This debate has brought attention to the
competitive nature of the health care marketplace, and physician responses to
managed care. This Issue Brief examines how physicians are reorganizing their
practices to meet the demands of the competitive marketplace.
Over the past ten years, two prominent trends have swept the health care
industry: managed care and the reorganization of physician practices.  Both
trends have emerged in response to pressures to control spending and provide
accountable health care, and are viewed as private sector solutions to cost
containment.  Medical practice has changed in the following ways:
• Group practices are largely replacing solo practitioners.  Between 1965 and
1991, the number of physician groups nearly quadrupled from 4,289 to
16,576.  Since 1991, the rate of group formation accelerated, reaching 19,787
groups in 1995. In contrast, the proportion of physicians in solo practice fell
from 40% in 1983 to about 30% in 1994.
• Advantages of group practice include sharing fixed costs and pooled revenues,
internalizing patient referrals and cross-coverage arrangements, and building
local market power.
• Medical practices are being integrated into larger organizations. This includes
outright purchase of practices by hospitals, universities, staff-model HMOs,
and (most commonly) other physicians. It also includes virtual integration
through strategic alliances between a hospital and its medical staff.
• Compared with solo and small group practices, larger practice organizations
offer physicians higher managed care contracting leverage and greater ability
to bear capitation risk.  Alliances serve as vehicles for hospital-physician
Medical practice is being
integrated into larger
organizational forms
collaboration, joint contracting with managed care organizations, and in some
cases, provide physicians with managerial expertise and capital in developing
their practices.
• Integration of health care can be achieved in two ways: horizontal integration,
which consolidates similar entities within one sector (such as merging
hospitals), and vertical integration, which merges different interdependent
sectors (such as hospitals and primary care practices).  The following studies
examine different methods of vertical integration.
Researchers and industry analysts commonly assume that increasing levels of
managed care in a market drive the formation of physician groups and hospital
alliances.  Physician-hospital integration is often mentioned as a provider
response to increasing cost-containment pressures from managed care
organizations.  However, the drivers and direction of change in local markets is
not clear, and many questions remain. For example:
• Does managed care penetration (the percentage of people insured by managed
care in a market) really drive providers to integrate?  Does managed care exert
a threshold effect so that, at some critical number or penetration level of
HMOs, we observe substantial alliance formation?
• Are alliances really provider mechanisms to reduce cost and improve quality,
or are they merely a countervailing force to bargain with consolidated
managed care organizations?
• How do market structure and competition affect alliance formation?  Does the
level of competition among managed care organizations or among hospitals
influence the formation of integrated relationships with physicians?
• Do health care market conditions influence physician groups to sell their
practices to larger organizations?  If so, are these organizations more likely to
be for-profit or not-for-profit?
Burns and colleagues assessed the relationship between managed care and
hospital-sponsored alliances with physicians from 1993 through 1995 using
national data from all urban markets. The alliances include independent
practitioner associations (IPAs), physician-hospital organizations (PHOs),
management services organizations (MSOs), and medical foundation models.
• Contrary to conventional wisdom, alliances are influenced by the number of
HMOs in a market rather than by HMO penetration. This result confirms a
growing perception that such alliances are contracting vehicles for managed
care: the greater the number of HMOs to contract with, the greater the
development of alliances.
Questions remain about the
relationship between market
forces and the emergence of
new physician organizations
and alliances
Study assesses impact of
managed care on the
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• When a small number of HMOs have deeply penetrated the market, few
physician-hospital alliances form.  In these highly concentrated HMO
markets, alliance formation may be discouraged—or may be perceived as too
late to provide an effective countervailing force.
• However, alliance formation is linked to HMO consolidation (mergers and
acquisitions that reduce the number of HMOs in a market).  This result
suggests that providers interpret HMO consolidation as increasing market
power on the part of payers, which elicits a similar response from physicians
and hospitals.
• There appears to be a threshold effect of managed care, where alliances are
most likely to appear in markets with at least four HMOs.
• The formation of physician-hospital alliances is associated with hospital
downsizing. This result suggests that hospitals may purse an integration
strategy in conjunction with other large-scale organizational changes.
Between 1991 and 1995, the number of physician groups owned by for-profit
corporations nearly tripled from 126 to 341. As of 1995, 684 groups were
owned by not-for-profit firms.  In another study, Burns and colleagues examined
the market characteristics that influenced the sale or formation of physician
group practices in metropolitan areas from 1991-1995.
• For-profit acquisition of group practices is not driven by local market
conditions, but rather by the buyer’s assessment of the group’s assets.
Multispecialty groups were more than twice as likely as single specialty groups
to be purchased by a for-profit corporation.
• In contrast, not-for-profit acquisition of group practices appears to be driven
by local competitive market conditions. These acquisitions were positively
associated with the extent of local HMO competition (as measured by the
number of HMOs in the market area), greater per capita physician supply,
and the extent of horizontal integration by hospitals (as measured by
membership in hospital systems).
• Not-for-profit firms are significantly more likely than for-profit firms to
purchase groups or form new groups that serve high proportions of Medicaid
patients.  It is possible that physician groups are acquired or formed by not-
for-profit firms as part of their strategy to seek Medicaid risk contracts and
manage utilization.
• While for-profit firms typically acquire and centrally manage group practices
across distant geographic markets, not-for-profit acquisitions are more
localized.  These results suggest that as competitive pressures in the local
market intensify and self-governing physicians resolve to sell their practices,
groups become integrated into other health care organizations already
operating in the area.
HMO market competition
is linked to the sale of
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS These studies add to a growing understanding of the relationship between
managed care and the organization of medical practice. This relationship is
complex, evolving, and not always intuitive.
• These results challenge the notion that managed care has a direct causal effect
on vertical integration of health care.  One possibility is that the causal
relationship is reversed. Alliances may develop in anticipation that managed
care is coming to a market, rather than in response.
• It may be that integrated health care is really a provider-initiated effort to
achieve the same power as consolidated health plans at the bargaining table.
Provider consolidation thus serves to blunt the downward force on hospital
and physician prices dictated by large, powerful health plans, rather than to
reduce costs or improve quality of care.
• Policymakers should consider these findings as they weigh the extent to which
local market forces can influence cost and quality outcomes.
